This research contributes to the literature on innovation and alliance f ormation by modeling the role of learning during cooperative innovation. Learning, modeled as knowledge accumulation as a consequence of an alliance, influences the parameters that will govern the alliance. Specifically, this paper focuses on the interplay between semiconductor companies and the suppliers of their production equipment during equipment modification projects. A multiperiod model presents the tradeoffs encountered during co-development, including whether a buyer should insist on customized modifications or modifications that are more generally applicable across the industry. Three case studies provide a context for the assumptions and findings of the model. At the root of economic growth and business success lies innovation, defined as the creation and deployment of useful knowledge. During the innovation process, firms often incorporate input from suppliers, competitors, and customers, and may form alliances to heighten the payoff from this input. This research identifies junctures in the innovation process where downstream firms partner with upstream firms to achieve a new capability, required to stay on an innovation trajectory, or "roadmap." The model introduced in this paper reflects how the downstream firm may actually shy away from customized innovations, because innovations that are generally applicable to the industry may engender a greater commitment to learning by the upstream partner.
At the root of economic growth and business success lies innovation, defined as the creation and deployment of useful knowledge. During the innovation process, firms often incorporate input from suppliers, competitors, and customers, and may form alliances to heighten the payoff from this input. This research identifies junctures in the innovation process where downstream firms partner with upstream firms to achieve a new capability, required to stay on an innovation trajectory, or "roadmap." The model introduced in this paper reflects how the downstream firm may actually shy away from customized innovations, because innovations that are generally applicable to the industry may engender a greater commitment to learning by the upstream partner.
In particular, t his paper examines inter-firm knowledge creation between buyers and suppliers of manufacturing equipment used to produce semiconductor devices. In order to meet the demanding technical requirements o f their production processes, semiconductor device makers-the "buyers"-often spearhead technology development projects with their equipment suppliers to advance the processing capabilities of their capital stock. By initiating codevelopment projects, a buyer can influence the features of the equipment, as well as the timing of equipment release to ensure adherence to its technology roadmap. The supplier in turn benefits from drawing on the customer's engineering expertise in addition to previewing new process technologies. This paper endeavors to capture the process of cooperative knowledge creation during innovation through the development of a model complemented by three case studies from the semiconductor industry. The model reflects a fundamental decision faced by a buyer when initiating an equipment improvement project: the buyer must decide whether to pursue customized equipment modifications or modifications that have broader applicability across the industry. This research focuses on equipment modifications late in the innovation cycle that target performance improvements such as enhanced processing speed, processing precision, or serviceability. The modifications may entail either a change to the hardware, e.g., a reconfiguration of a processing chamber, the addition of a new sensor, the installation of new robotics capabilities, etc., or a change to the software controlling the machine, or both. Even when committing sizable resources to a modification project, the buyer may opt for broad applicability rather than specify customized hardware modifications. In exchange, the buyer enjoys inter-temporal benefits from knowledge accumulation at the supplier prompted by the need to support the equipment over a large customer base. Three case studies offer evidence for the assumptions and findings of the model. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the literature on cooperative innovation and user-led technology development. In Section II, the model of buyersupplier co-development is constructed. Section III follows with the case studies, and the final section offers conclusions and suggests future paths for research on cooperative knowledge creation.
I. COOPERATIVE INNOVATION AND THE USER AS THE TECHNOLOGY DRIVER
The primary contribution of this paper is to probe the process of knowledge accumulation at the equipment supplier as a consequence of co-development, and how this knowledge accumulation influences the innovative buyer in setting the parameters that will govern the codevelopment project. The co-development projects examined in this paper constitute buyer-led alliances that merge the complementary skills and strategies of the semiconductor manufacturers and their equipment suppliers. The partners bring their respective expertise to the relationship in accordance with the formal or informal guidelines of the alliance agreement. As a consequence of the alliance, the partners may become increasingly interdependent, particularly when the alliance results in success and the partners become long-term collaborators.
An extensive literature analyzes the importance of complementarities in alliance formation, the menu of organizational forms appropriate to govern those complementarities, and the nature of interdependencies resulting from interfirm partnering (Harrigan, 1985; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Sinha and Cusumano, 1991; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Gulati, 1995; Sakakibara, 1997; Doz and Hamel, 1998; Lazaric and Marengo, 2000; Spekman et al., 2000; Rothaermel, 2001 ). In the context of this paper, the uncertainties facing semiconductor manufacturers and their equipment vendors as they progress along a technology roadmap dictate which complementary knowledge or skills would be the basis for alliance formation. These uncertainties w ill be explored before turning to the interdependencies that co-development may foster.
Semiconductor manufacturers and their equipment suppliers engage in cooperative development at junctures along their technology roadmaps, and these junctures exhibit different levels of uncertainty. The technology roadmaps governing the pace and direction of innovation in the semiconductor industry reflect the interlacing of new chip designs, new process technologies to produce those new designs, which in turn dictate the performance requirements of new manufacturing equipment. Roadmapping occurs at both an industry-level and a firm-level (Kostoff and Schaller, 2001) , and has given rise to the fulfillment of "Moore's Law," adapted from Gordon Moore's prophetic observation in 1965, that the number of transistors per chip seemed to double every 18-24 months (Intel, 2001 ).
The junctures in the roadmap where chip makers and their suppliers cooperate range from those shrouded in extreme uncertainty early in the development cycle to those later in the cycle where modifications of existing equipment hardware are required to optimize production yields. 5 The former have been characterized as periods of technological discontinuity where a dominant architecture has yet to emerge (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990) ; the latter focus on continuous improvement activities by owners of the competing architectures "approved" by the industry in cooperation with their users (Burgelman, 1994; Flaherty, 2000) . Figure 1 depicts the type of roadmapping conducted in the semiconductor industry at the equipment level. Constructed at a particular point in time, in this case 1994, this roadmap captures the anticipated entry points for subsequent generations of lithographic systems, w hich are the tools used to project the patterns of circuitry on to silicon wafers during the production of semiconductor devices.
1 Migration from one group of technologies contained in the gray boxes to a subsequent group reflects junctures in the innovation cycle with tremendous levels of uncertainty. In contrast, within each box, "enhancements" occur, and these signify the late stages of the innovation cycle when the industry selects a few lithography technologies for optimization.
Firms partner to mitigate uncertainties inherent in both the early and late stages of innovation, and these uncertainties include leadership (Which firms will spearhead the innovation efforts?), performance (Can processing goals be met?), preemption (Will the life of existing technologies be extended?), and adoption (Will an infrastructure support deployment?) uncertainties (Table 1) . 2 This paper focuses on equipment architectures targeted for buyersupplier modification activities that occur late in the innovation cycle. By f ocusing on the late stages of innovation when dominant designs are beginning to emerge, this paper demonstrates 1 Lithography systems represent a major capital expense for semiconductor manufacturers. Given this, the manufacturers work with their suppliers to extend the life of existing systems for as along as possible. A radical departure from the state-of-the-art, which uses photons to pattern the wafers, to so-called next -generation lithography systems (e.g., electron-beam or ion-beam projection in Figure 1 ) has been postponed repeated times invalidating the timeline in Figure 1 (Henderson, 1995; Appleyard, 2001) . 2 In their analysis of next -generation lithography, Linden et al., (2001) , consider two types of uncertainty closely related to those labeled performance and preemption uncertainty: "technology" and "timing" uncertainty.
how the uncertainties surrounding adoption of a new equipment technology may be mitigated through alliances between the supplier and potential buyers.
Alliances facilitate industry acceptance of new manufacturing equipment technologies, because the lead users who enter into the alliances will augment the supplier's knowledge stock and commit resources, both human and financial, to help stabilize t he equipment in a manufacturing setting. The alliances give rise to interdependencies across the partnering firms.
From the viewpoint of the buyer, involvement in the alliance will likely guarantee timely delivery of the new equipment in accordance with the buyer's roadmap for production processes, but the buyer will be able to influence the features of the equipment. From the viewpoint of the equipment supplier, these late stage co-development alliances provide a way to lock-in the buyer to their equipment architecture, while permitting the supplier to learn from their users (Leonard, 1995; Doz and Hamel, 1998 ).
This paper focuses on how knowledge accumulation at the equipment supplier during the course of a late stage equipment optimization project influences the specifications of the project.
A number of studies have examined the central role of knowledge for a firm's strategy and success (Winter, 1987; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996) and the implications of knowledge flows during interfirm cooperation (Kogut and Zander, 1992) . This study asks specifically whether an innovative buyer will demand customized modifications or modifications more generally applicable to other buyers in the industry when taking into account the associated knowledge accumulation at the supplier.
As the primary drivers of the innovative activity in the semiconductor, the semiconductor manufacturers become the "convenors" of late-stage equipment optimization alliances (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) . Because of their familiarity with the whole semiconductor production process and their "deeper pockets," these buyers have an appreciable influence over the parameters of the 7 resultant alliance based on the degree of customization they desire of their equipment set. As discussed below, user-led technology development is common in many industries. Perhaps what is somewhat surprising in the semiconductor industry is the magnitude of investment in codevelopment projects made by buyers for modifications that have general applicability across the industry.
Over the last decades, a number of leading semiconductor producers (e.g., IBM, AT&T
[Lucent], and Texas Instruments) have shifted from making their own production equipment to purchasing it from independent suppliers. This pattern of "vertical disintegration" is common as an industry matures (Stigler, 1951) . Although chip makers and their equipment suppliers have become increasingly independent in terms of ownership, both early-stage and late-stage codevelopment is common. As noted, the chip manufacturers often become active lead-users during late-stage projects when the suppliers strive to stabilize the processing capabilities of their tools to achieve the technical specifications of proprietary production processes.
The existing literature addressing user-led innovation presents evidence that buyerinitiated co-development can both accelerate and influence the nature of innovation. The machine tool industry and the semiconductor industry have provided fertile ground for examining the role of sophisticated buyers in shaping the product offerings of their equipment suppliers. As seen in the machine tool industry, the evolution of an equipment-supplying industry may depend on multiple buying industries (e.g., firearms, sewing-machine, bicycle, and automobile) for the progression of its technology (Rosenberg, 1963) . Within the Japanese machine tool industry, more recent evidence of knowledge flows from buyers (automakers) to the machine tool suppliers suggests that such flows can enhance innovative performance of the suppliers (Lee, 1996) .
Echoing the findings from the machine tool studies, von Hippel (1977) In the semiconductor industry, determining whether a new tool meets a customer's specifications can only be confirmed once the tool is i nstalled in the customer's fabrication facility and it processes a sizable number of wafers, a phenomenon that heightens this dependence of suppliers on their buyers. 4 Thus users often initiate innovation, and their suppliers succeed by honing their "product engineering skills" rather than their R&D abilities (Teece, 1992, p.11) . The suppliers must ferret out the needs of their customers and meet their customers' specifications.
The existing literature has established the phenomenon of user-led innovation, particularly in industries such as the semiconductor industry where the user's breadth of technical knowledge historically eclipsed that of their equipment suppliers. The studies discussed above present evidence that buyer-initiated co-development influences the pace and content of knowledge accumulation within certain industries. A few studies have detailed the interactions between buyers and suppliers while they undertake co-development. Two notable examples are Longo (1995) , which evaluates the relative success of sixteen co-development projects in the semiconductor industry, and Shuen (1994) , which examines co-development projects between a semiconductor producer and two of its component packaging suppliers.
Given the aggressive patenting behavior in the semiconductor industry (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) , concerns over the control of intellectual property rights can influence the outcomes of cooperative development projects. A few projects at SEMATECH have suffered from concern over the horizontal leakage of intellectual property across chip producers when multiple buyers worked jointly with an equipment supplier on modifications (Longo, 1995) .
However, the transfer of intellectual property along vertical channels may allow a buyer to entice a supplier to commit resources to a co-development project (Shuen, 1994) . Chip producers may prefer time-to-market advantages afforded by early delivery of the modified equipment in exchange for sharing intellectual property ownership. The buyer can attempt to curb knowledge spillovers by filing patents jointly with the supplier, co-opting the supplier's resources by conducting subsequent co-development projects, and filling the supplier's processing capacity to prevent other chip producers from utilizing the new technology (Shuen, 1994) .
The model of buyer-supplier co-development in the presence of knowledge accumulation at the equipment supplier introduced in the next section addresses many of the features highlighted by past studies of buyer-supplier co-development. In particular, the model captures project definition by the buyer in light of knowledge accumulation at the supplier. The three case studies in the subsequent section offer evidence for the assumptions made by the model.
II. MODELING BUYER-SUPPLIER CO-DEVELOPMENT
The previous section introduced innovation pursued through vertical alliances and the phenomenon of buyer-led co-development which is common in the semiconductor industry. This section models one of the tradeoffs faced by an innovative buyer when engaging in late-stage cooperative knowledge creation with a supplier: whether to pursue customized equipment modifications at the expense of knowledge accumulation at the supplier that would accompany generally applicable modifications. The buyer is assumed to be a chip producer that identifies a processing need only attainable by modifying a particular piece of equipment. 5 The required modification is radical enough that the hardware (and/or software) must be reconfigured, but the equipment supplier cannot modify the hardware without guidance from the buyer's processrelated knowledge. The two parties enter into a cooperative agreement, bringing their complementary expertise to the relationship: the buyer's knowledge of the chemistry and physics of its production process is merged with the supplier's knowledge of machine-tooling and calibration to produce the modification.
The model developed below captures the tradeoffs a buyer faces when initiating an equipment improvement project in the semiconductor industry. 6 On one hand, the buyer wants the piece of equipment, or "tool," to be tailored to its particular processing needs. On the other hand, the buyer wants the supplier to build on the learning resulting from co-development over time. It is assumed that equipment suppliers will more readily expand their knowledge associated with modifications generally applicable across their customer base, because they will face greater incentives to continuously improve the equipment and hone their skills in servicing equipment that is broadly deployed. 7, 8 The modification in turn will become a lasting improvement in successive generations of the tool. This assumption, that equipment suppliers will more readily incorporate and enhance hardware changes that have general applicability across their customer base, is consistent with patterns in the industry. 9,10 Under certain initial conditions, the model shows that buyers will pursue equipment modifications that have some applicability to other device makers' processing needs, to benefit from knowledge accumulation at the supplier.
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Profit maximization requires the buyer to select how general it wishes to make the modification, reflected by its choice over the degree of generality, γ, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 with γ = 0, representing a customized modification. Figure 2 shows how the decision confronting the innovative buyer becomes more than a simple "make" decision in the "make" versus "buy"
7 Implicit in this line of reasoning is that the innovative buyers do not dominate their suppliers' sales. Also, the buyer must be able to credibly threaten "defection" to another supplier. 8 See Leachman (1997) for the types of supplier support provided in the semiconductor industry and the international variation in the provision of support. Von Hippel and Tyre (1995) analyze the learning processes following equipment installation in the assembly stage of the electronics industry when the components are attached to the circuit boards. 9 Langlois (1992) attributes the creation of "cluster-tools" in the semiconductor industry to the accumulation of general knowledge at the equipment suppliers directed by technical standards agreed upon by the industry. 10 In one of their case studies in the automotive industry, Lazaric and Marengo (2000) illustrate the difficulties in executing a buyer-supplier co-development project when a buyer demands a customized solution that generates "local" knowledge rather than "general" knowledge. However, Dyer and Ouchi (1993) find that suppliers to both Japanese and U.S. automakers do invest in customized capital equipment to serve their customers. Across twentyeight supplier firms in Japan affiliated with their customers through a vertical keiretsu relationship, they found the average level of customized capital equipment to be 31 percent (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993, p.61) . 11 As Shuen (1994) found, irrespective of knowledge accumulation at the supplier, time-to-market advantages enjoyed by innovative buyers also figure into a buyer's decision to engage in equipment co-development. In addition, benefits from previewing the equipment accrue to the innovative buyer, contributing to knowledge accumulation at the buyer. Von Hippel (2001) labels this latter benefit "learning by doing" and notes an additional benefit from user-led innovation-it dislodges "sticky" information from the user.
dyad-the buyer parameterizes the resultant c o-development project through its choice of γ.
12
The innovative buyer also selects the levels of engineering hours, E, in light of the wage rate w, and capital, K, in light of the effective rental rate (r+γ 2 ). It is assumed that γ raises the effective rental rate of capital, because generally applicable modifications are not as effective in reducing capital costs as custom modifications. However, this undesirable effect is mitigated by an "economies of scale" effect resulting from large production runs at the supplier when the modification is generally applicable. 13 This mitigating effect is incorporated by squaring γ in the effective rental rate of capital term. It is also assumed that the supplier's stock of knowledge at time t, A S t , is positively related to γ, and heightens the productivity of K.
14 Therefore, γ has two positive effects on a buyer when the buyer pursues generally applicable modifications: knowledge growth at the supplier and the benefit from economies of scale in its equipment purchases. However, γ has a negative effect on the buyer's net revenue in a given period, because it raises the effective rental rate of capital, (r+γ 2 ). 15 In summary, by choosing a large γ, a buyer would benefit from an improved equipment set over time as the supplier incorporates general modifications and improves the support for its general equipment "platform," but the buyer would incur greater costs of capital in any point in time by forgoing customized equipment (although this effect is somewhat mitigated through economies of scale). Buyer i maximizes its stream of profits over the lifetime of this particular process technology, T, with respect to γ t and subject to the supplier's knowledge accumulation function (ignoring discounting): A reduced form of the model can be constructed as follows. To simplify the model, it is assumed that the only input into the production process is capital equipment enhanced by the supplier's knowledge stock, or A S t *K t . The time subscript can be dropped from K, because the buyer only purchases equipment once during the life of a process flow-when it launches the new semiconductor process. To simplify notation further, both K and the buyer's chip price, p, are set equal to one. 16 Under these conditions, the net revenue function becomes:
15 Furthermore, if competitors could purchase the modified equipment, the cost advantage enjoyed by the innovative buyer would be eroded. The innovative buyer would need to construct safeguards against this erosion. 16 Setting the price to one is innocuous if the time periods are very short (consistent with the suppression of discounting). However, in the primary commodity product markets in the semiconductor industry, e.g., the DRAM market, significant price penalties exist for delayed ramps to high-volume production so even small increments of time may be very important. See Appleyard et al. (2000) and Terwiesch et al. (1999) for analyses of new process introductions into high-volume production in the semiconductor and hard disk drive industries, respectively.
Knowledge growth at the supplier is assumed to be a simple relationship where its knowledge next period is equal to its knowledge this period plus the increment it accumulates as a consequence of the co-development project, or
The useful life of the process flow is assumed to be three years (T=3), so in the fourth year, the equipment is worthless and the associated knowledge at the supplier is also worthless ( ) ( 
III. CASE STUDIES OF BUYER-INITIATED CO-DEVELOPMENT
Three cases studies of buyer-supplier co-development projects in the semiconductor industry were conducted in order to examine the assumptions and implications of the model. The model emphasizes one of the primary decisions made early in the three projects: how closely to adhere to the industry's technology roadmap versus departing from the roadmap for specific needs of the buyer who initiated the project? After the project partners resolved this question and defined the scope o f the projects, they set project milestones and determined resource commitments. The three case studies address these decisions.
Methodology
A leading U.S. semiconductor producer (pseudonym: ChipCo) agreed to the study of three of its equipment modification projects. 19 All of the projects took place in the development center of the buyer. The lead technologists involved in the projects completed the survey and participated in three on-site interviews conducted by the author. The representatives from the buyer returned one survey in the fall of 1997 and the other two in February 1998. It took a great deal longer to gain access to the suppliers involved in the projects (pseudonyms: EquipCo1 for project 1 and EquipCo2 for projects 2 and 3). In the end, EquipCo1 did not return the survey pertaining to project 1, and in fact, many of the project team members had left the company. 18 The initial value of the supplier's knowledge stock consistent with this finding and the other assumptions of the model is: Consistent with von Hippel's classification of user-dominant innovation, ChipCo initiated all three of the projects and played a leadership role throughout the life of the projects. The buyer had a keen interest in making the projects succeed, because it was working on these projects in preparation for the immediate release of new process flows. 20 According to the respondents from the buyer, the suppliers also were very committed to the projects not only to satisfy their customer but also because the modifications were generally applicable across the industry. Both sides contributed a non-trivial level of resources to these projects, which reflects the demanding environment of semiconductor equipment and process development. Even though the buyer and supplier in each case study were highly committed to the projects, only one of the three projects succeeded in satisfying the buyer's needs both in terms of technical capability and compatibility with new production processes.
Correspondence between Survey Data and Areas of Inquiry
The survey instrument addresses three primary lines of inquiry: knowledge growth at the supplier, the implications of general applicability of the modification, and the determinants of project success. The first two areas of inquiry directly address the characteristics of the dynamic model of co-development developed in this paper. The survey contains questions targeted at determining the level of general applicability of the modification and the project's contribution 19 The author requested projects that had been completed as close to the survey date as possible and included at least one unsuccessful project. 20 As Tripsas identifies, buyers often spark upstream innovation as a consequence of changes to their "system of use," i.e., changes to their process flow in this context (Tripsas, 2001 , p.12).
to knowledge accumulation. The survey attempts to address two additional assumptions made through the modeling specification. One assumption asserts that generally applicable modifications have a detrimental effect on the buyer's net revenue relative to customized modifications due to a lower per period cost savings. Second, it was assumed that generally applicable modifications are favorable, in that they reduce the effective rental rate of capital through economies of scale in equipment production. By collecting data on cost savings attributable to the modifications and price breaks granted to the buyer by the supplier on equipment purchases, the survey provides some basis for these assumptions.
The survey approaches the final area of inquiry-project success-from a variety of angles. In the first part of the survey, the respondents are asked to state whether the project was a success or failure with an explanation, and at the end of the survey, they are asked to evaluate whether they would have entered into the project knowing what they knew by the end of the project. There are a number of other measures of success contained in the survey, including time and cost overruns and performance to goals. The survey collects data on possible factors that might contribute to the success or failure of projects. These factors include the engineering time spent on the modification, whether the modification has a general applicability across the industry, the relationships between the buyer and supplier, the urgency of the modification for the buyer and the supplier, and the degree to which the modification constitutes a radical innovation.
The projects in detail. The survey asks the respondents to consider three primary stages of co-development and classify the modification project accordingly ( EquipCo2 corroborated this assessment for project 3. The projects entailed changes to the machines to achieve process specifications set by ChipCo, as dictated by ChipCo's new production processes.
The survey responses indicate that the three projects targeted generally applicable modifications and required resources from both the buyer and supplier even for projects 2 and 3, which ChipCo classified as incremental innovations. The primary features of the projects are summarized in Table 3 . Project 1 involved a new technique for connecting the metal layers of an integrated circuit. Projects 2 and 3 both involved etching procedures that remove unwanted layers of deposited compounds such as oxide in the case of project 2 and metal in the case of project 3. Even t hough ChipCo only considered project 3 to be an overall success, it would have entered into all of the projects again knowing what it knew after their completion.
As shown in Table 4a , the radical nature of modification project 1 bears out in terms of engineering resources committed by ChipCo and intellectual property generated during the course of the project. ChipCo devoted over twice the engineering resources to project 1, relative to the other projects, and both ChipCo and EquipCo1 secured patents and/or trade secrets related to the modification. One of the incremental modification projects, project 2, had the greatest cost overrun in percentage terms and the longest time overrun. Also, the total cost to ChipCo for an incremental modification project, p roject 3, exceeded its expenditures on project 1. This likely reflected ChipCo's willingness to assume more risk in a project that faced a greater likelihood of success from the outset. When the project costs are decomposed further, a number of striking findings emerge (Tables 5a and 5b ). First, the share of the "Other" category in total costs is large, particularly for project 2. For all three projects, the "Other" category reflects installation costs. W hen semiconductor manufacturers add tools to their clean rooms, they must contend with the delivery of gases and liquids to the tools, air filtration systems, concerns about machine vibrations, delivery systems that transport the silicon wafers around the factory, etc., which contribute to high installation costs. Another striking finding is that material costs can be at least as great as engineering costs (projects 2 and 3). For project 2, ChipCo noted that the silicon wafers sent through the new equipment dominated its materials costs. Finally, for the more radical modification, project 1, engineering expenses composed a much larger share of the buyer's total costs, suggesting the importance of buyer expertise for radical equipment modifications.
Assessing the modeling assumptions . Although the projects varied in terms of their magnitude, they were similar in that they pursued modifications that were not tailor-made for ChipCo but had a more general applicability to the equipment supplier's customer base (Table   6 ). ChipCo anticipated that other semiconductor manufacturers would wish to use the technology developed through the three projects, and, for projects 1 and 3, ChipCo explicitly stated that the suppliers would incorporate the improvements into their product lines. 21 EquipCo2 agreed with this assessment for project 3, and, when asked for specific company names, replied, "All semiconductor manufacturers," including DRAM, microprocessor, and ASIC producers. The modification pursued by project 1 was slightly less "general" in its applicability in that it was developed for a specific tool sold by EquipCo1. In contrast, ChipCo anticipated that the new technologies resulting from projects 2 and 3 could be incorporated into other tools sold by EquipCo2 or tools sold by other suppliers.
Knowledge accumulation at the supplier is central to the model presented in this paper. Table 7 contains quotes from the buyer pertaining to what the suppliers learned from each project. 22 According to ChipCo, the suppliers benefited from knowledge growth associated with the technology and overall project management. Given the radical nature of project 1 and the process integration problems that contributed to its failure, it is not surprising that ChipCo identified project management as a key learning point for the supplier.
In addition to its reliance on knowledge accumulation at the supplier, the model presented in this paper assumes that, the more generally applicable a modification, the less the cost savings but the greater t he gains from economies of scale in the manufacture of the tool. These two opposing effects are reflected in Table 8 . Because the modifications undertaken through the three projects could be classified as generally applicable, there is not a case covering a custom modification for comparison. Nevertheless, the findings from the case studies allow one to reflect on the modeling assumptions. The data from project 1 -and to a lesser extent from project 3 -call the first assumption into question. Even though project 1's modification was generally applicable across the industry, it still led to a sizable per wafer cost savings (20%) for
ChipCo. This cost savings, though, may be more attributable to the fact that the project 1 was a radical innovation, rather than i nterpreted to mean that even generally applicable modifications can result in large cost savings. The net loss of project 2 is more consistent with the assumption.
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The second assumption appears to be less controversial. In two of the projects, the supplier did provide the buyer with equipment discounts, consistent with the assumption that tools should cost less if the supplier can sell more of them to a larger customer base (generally applicable modifications). Only through a larger sample of projects can these assumptions be properly evaluated.
To understand project performance, the survey asks the respondents to list the primary technical goals of the project and performance to these goals, ultimately measured in per wafer cost savings. As the results show (Table 9 ), only project 3 was considered an overall success.
Neither project 1 nor project 2 achieved process yield targets, which reflected the incompatibility between the tools and ChipCo's production process and ultimately led to the demise of the projects. However, the modification in project 1 achieved its technical goals for the most part and was considered technically acceptable by ChipCo. Project 2 faced more dire problems in that ChipCo did not thoroughly verify processing results and realized late in the project that processing results were not repeatable across EquipCo2's oxide etch tools installed at ChipCo.
Although project 1 achieved a number of its technical goals, ChipCo could not integrate the modified tool into the process flow dictated by the design rules of the device that it was manufacturing. This incompatibility cost EquipCo1 a great deal of foregone revenue, because
EquipCo1 had planned to ship 20-30 tools to ChipCo, but ChipCo ended up leasing less than five tools. This example u nderscores the challenges of semiconductor manufacturing, where technical capability is a necessary condition for the success of an equipment modification project but not a sufficient one, particularly when confronting technically demanding process integration issues (Table 10) .
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As noted above in Table 3 
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the interaction between innovation and alliance formation across buyers and their equipment suppliers. In particular, this research examines the nuances of 24 The knowledge management framework presented in Bohn (1994) suggests that new hardware capabilities can prove a "scientific method feasible" but fall short of running a "local recipe" successfully. This distinction is precisely the one encountered by project 1. Iansiti and West (1999) highlight technology integration as the leading contributor to success in semiconductor technology development. However, they emphasize integration in the earlier stages of the R&D process.
cooperative knowledge creation undertaken by semiconductor device manufacturers (the buyers) and the vendors of their manufacturing equipment (the suppliers). To migrate to new device generations, semiconductor producers frequently initiate equipment modification projects with their suppliers. The model developed in this paper addresses the puzzling fact that semiconductor producers, though fiercely competitive, often initiate equipment modification projects that have general applicability across the industry. Nevertheless, the buyers enjoy an overall benefit from this co-development strategy due to the gains attributable to knowledge accumulation at the supplier. This outcome underscores the potential importance of learning as a consequence of alliance formation.
The three co-development projects examined in this paper lend support to the assumptions upon which the model is based and demonstrate the influential role that inter-firm relationships play. The one project that was successful, project 3, pursued a modest technical improvement and benefited from the close relationship between the buyer and supplier; this permitted the supplier to integrate its tool effectively into the buyer's process flow.
A number of questions regarding buyer-supplier co-development remain unanswered.
Specific to the semiconductor industry, the degree to which suppliers remain dependent on their buyers to initiate, guide, and fund projects merits a systematic assessment. Table 3a . The highest calculated value is associated with project 1 ($79/hour) and the lowest is associated with project 3 ($42/hour). This difference is larger than can be explained by the qualifications of the engineers involved in the projects. The discrepancy may reflect the difficulty in estimating and allocating total project costs or that the engineers in project 3 devoted unpaid hours to the project or were partially compensated by non-project funds. TABLE 7 Supplier Learning according to ChipCo
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3
Knowledge growth at supplier • "parallel evaluations of tools" imperative
• "systematic root-cause analysis" required
• must play "a more active role in integration"
• "tool design" Blank a a According to EquipCo2's survey response, its engineers learned: "Commitment level of the partner is critical"; "Clear objectives are required"; and "Be flexible." 
